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ABSTRACT
We study a war scenario in which the winner occupies the loser’s territory.
Attacking a territory increases the chance of winning, but also causes harm,
which in turn decreases the territory’s value (i.e. the reward ofwinning). This
paper highlights the effects of this trade-off on the equilibrium strategies of
the warring states in a contest game with endogenous rewards. Providing
both static and dynamic models, our analysis captures insights regarding
strategic behavior in asymmetric contests with such conflict.
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Armed confrontations or wars typically involve conflicts over the control or possession of particular
pieces of territorybetween two states. The contendingparties expendmeansof destruction to increase
their probability of capturing the rival’s territory. However, attacking a territory causes harm, thereby
decreasing the value of the contested territory. This creates a trade-off since an increase in one’s
attack level increases one’s winning probability, but decreases one’s reward. This trade-off is clearly
emphasized in the ‘Art of War’ by Sun Tzu as follows: ‘In the practical art of war, the best thing of all
is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good’. This paper
highlights the effects of this trade-off on the equilibrium strategies of the warring states in static and
dynamic contest games with endogenous rewards.
Contests have been extensively utilized under the assumption of an exogenously fixed reward
to model conflicts in various contexts such as sports, rent-seeking, patent races, economics of ad-
vertising, and political campaigns (for an excellent book on contests, see Konrad 2009). However,
the endogenous nature of rewards depending on the efforts of contestants appears not to have
been rigorously analyzed in the theoretical conflict literature. Among few exceptions, Alexeev and
Leitzel (1996) considered static rent-seeking contests in which the reward of winning decreases in
the aggregate effort of the other players; Chung (1996) studied positive externalities in rent-seeking
contests by assuming that the reward of winning increases in the aggregate effort of all players;
Shaffer (2006) analyzed the equilibrium behavior in a contest with two symmetric players, considering
positive and negative externalities imposed by both players’ efforts; and Hirai and Szidarovszky (2013)
investigated the existence anduniqueness of Nash equilibriumafter defining reward as any function of
the aggregate effort of all players. Finally, Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011) generalized such models
by constructing a two-player Tullock contest where the payoff of each player is a linear function of
rewards, own effort, and the rival’s effort.
In this paper, we assume that each player is endowed with a territory and study a two-player
Tullock contest in which the winner occupies the loser’s territory. A novel feature of our analysis is the
assumption that the value of the territory player i aims to occupy decreases in player i’s own effort. In
that regard, we contribute to the literature on contests with endogenous rewards. Another novelty lies
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in the incorporation of the possibility of a draw. To the best of our knowledge, although the first referral
to draw in contest models was by Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), this possibility has been disregarded
in the existing literature on contests with endogenous rewards. We fill this gap by assuming that if
the contest results in a draw, both players keep their own territories, which implies that although an
increase in a player’s effort decreases his/her own payoff from winning, it also decreases the rival’s
payoff in case of a draw. This makes a remarkable impact on the equilibrium efforts.1 Furthermore, we
utilize the possibility of a draw in extending our analysis to a dynamic contest.
First, we analyze the static version of this armed conflict in an asymmetric contest game. This allows
us to investigate what implications the differences in the initial territory values and the vulnerability
to threat may have on a player’s choice of contest effort. We find the unique Nash equilibrium of the
model and provide comparative statics analyses. Next, we extend our analysis to a dynamic contest
with two periods. If there is a winner in the first period, then the contest ends with the winner
occupying the loser’s territory. If the first period results in a draw, however, then the contest proceeds
to the second period. Assuming that the losses in territory values accumulate, we analyze subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of this model in several numerical examples and illustrate how the prospect
of proceeding to the second period might affect the equilibrium behavior.
Our paper is related to the game-theoretic analysis of territorial disputes. Chang, Potter, and
Sanders (2007) characterized the outcome of a territorial dispute between two rival parties under
the assumption that engaging in conflict destructs a fixed ratio of the resources. Later, Chang and
Luo (2013) endogenized the destruction assuming that the resources decrease in the amount of guns
used in warfare. Both of these papers analyzed the conditions under which war or settlement arises
between the contending parties. In this paper, although we only concentrate on the case of conflict,
our analysis allows us to derive conditions characterizing when players prefer to avoid war.2
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we present the static contest game,
characterize its unique Nash equilibrium, and provide comparative statics analyses for the equilibrium
strategies. We also extend our analysis to a dynamic contest game. The last section concludes.
TheModel
There are two players i = 1, 2. Each player i is endowed with a territory which has a certain value,
denoted by Vi > 0. They are in a war, which is modeled as a two-player contest game. Each player i
has the strategy set [0, Bi], such that the upper bound corresponds to the highest destruction power
possible with the weapons/bombs/etc. player i already owns (for which the cost is fixed). The players
simultaneously choose how much destruction power to use in this war. The winner is determined by
a Tullock contest success function. In particular, player i wins the contest with probability
pi(b1, b2) = bibi + bj + d
where bi is the destruction power used by player i and d > 0 represents the case of a draw. Accordingly,
the probability of a draw is3,4
pd(b1, b2) = dbi + bj + d .
The winner occupies the opposition’s territory, so that the winner has two territories and the loser
has nothing at the end of the war. Finally, if the contest results in a draw, both parties keep their own
territories.
In this paper, we assume that both territories are vulnerable to incoming attacks, meaning that
their values decrease in the incoming attack level. Therefore, the value of player i’s territory is actually
a decreasing function Vi : [0, Bj] → (0, Vi] satisfying Vi(0) = Vi . This assumption creates a trade-off
since an increase in one’s attack level increases one’s winning probability, but decreases one’s reward.
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In this model, the expected utility function to be maximized by player i is
bi
bi + bj + d (Vi(bj) + Vj(bi)) +
d
bi + bj + dVi(bj)
given that player j used bj amount of destruction power. Then, the first-order condition5 with respect
to bi can be written as
bj + d
(bi + bj + d)2 (Vi(bj) + Vj(bi)) +
bi




bi + bj + dVi(bj) = 0.
From this point onward, in order to have more concrete ideas about the outcome of this contest,
we consider a specific functional form for the value of each territory. For every i = 1, 2, assume that
Vi(bj) = Vi − αibj (1)
such that Vi > αiBj > 0 where αi is the territory’s vulnerability to incoming attacks.
Given this territory value function, we find the following best response function for player 16:
BR1(b2) = −(b2 + d) +
√





Player 2’s best response function is symmetric:
BR2(b1) = −(b1 + d) +
√





We can see that BRi(bj) > 0 for every i = 1, 2 and every bj ∈ [0, Bj]. This means that each player
always prefers to actively participate in this war. The intersection of these best response functions




α2(V1 + V2) + 2α1α2d +
√




α1(V1 + V2) + 2α1α2d +
√
α1α2[(V1 + V2)2 + 4d(α1V2 + α2V1) + 4α1α2d2]
(2)
It is also worth emphasizing that BRi(bj) > Bi is possible for some i = 1, 2 and some bj ∈ [0, Bj]. In
such cases, it might turn out that the intersection of these best response functions lies outside the set
of strategy profiles. This would push players to the boundaries of their strategy sets in the equilibrium.
Using this information, the following proposition characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium of the
model.
Proposition 1: In the above-described two-player territory occupation game, the unique Nash equilib-
rium can be characterized by:
(b∗1, b∗2) = (b̄1, b̄2) if b̄i ≤ Bi for every i ∈ {1, 2}
= (B1,BR2(B1)) if b̄1 > B1 andBR2(B1) ≤ B2
= (BR1(B2), B2) if b̄2 > B2 andBR1(B2) ≤ B1
= (B1, B2) if otherwise.
Now that we have characterized the unique Nash equilibrium of this game, we turn to comparative
statics analyses. First, we focus on the best response function: BRi . This best response function
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increases in V1 and V2, but decreases in α1 and α2. Thus, both players become more aggressive when
either of the territories’ starting value increases since the reward of winning would increase, meaning
that they would have more room to destruct.7 Moreover, both players become less aggressive when
either of the territories becomesmore vulnerable to attack since using the same amount of destruction
powerwould lead tomoredestruction.8 Finally, theeffectof an increase ind onbest responses ismixed.
In particular, BRi increases in d when Vj > 2
√
αjbj(Vi − αibj), which is possible for sufficiently high
values of αi and Vj or sufficiently low values of αj and Vi .9 The interpretation is as follows. If d increases,
then the effect ofbi onplayer i’swinningprobability diminishes. Thismight discourageplayer i, leading
to a decrease in his/her best response to a given bj . On the other hand, such a diminishing effect in
the probability of winning also decreases the attacking cost for player i since the cost is incurred only
when player i wins the contest. From this perspective, player i’s best response to a given bj might
increase in d. Hence, the overall effect is mixed.
From this point onward, we concentrate on the interior equilibrium: (b̄1, b̄2). First, the equilibrium
strategy b̄i decreases in αj , so that trying to occupy a more vulnerable territory indicates a lower
equilibrium effort. Unfortunately, comparative statics with respect to the other model parameters are
not straightforward. Yet, for most cases, we numerically see that b̄i decreases in αi , but increases in V1
and V2.10
As an advantage of studying an asymmetric model, we can additionally write:
(i) When α1 = α2, if player i starts with a more valuable territory than player j does (i.e. Vi > Vj),
then player i uses less destruction power in the equilibrium than player j does.
(ii) When V1 = V2, if player i has a more vulnerable territory than player j has (i.e. αi > αj ), then
player i uses more destruction power in the equilibrium than player j does.
Below we present two special cases of our model. These special cases have better looking interior
equilibria, thereby allowing us to provide a full characterization of comparative statics.
Remark 1: If players are symmetric, i.e. ifV1 = V2 = V andα1 = α2 = α, then the interior equilibrium








In this case, the equilibrium strategies are both increasing in V and decreasing in α. Moreover, the
equilibrium strategies do not depend on d.
Remark 2: When there is no possibility of a draw, i.e. when d = 0, the interior equilibrium would
reduce to: (
V1 + V2





In this case, the equilibrium strategies are both increasing in V1 and V2, whereas they are both
decreasing in α1 and α2. Interestingly, the difference between starting territory values has no effect in
the equilibrium strategies.
Finally, we can relate our findings to the literature on the cost of conflict analyzing the conditions
under which the contending parties choose to avoid war. In our model, the expected utilities at the
unique Nash equilibrium can be compared with the pre-war utility Vi , so that players do not engage in
warfare only if the latter is no less than the former for both players. Along similar lines, if a binding side
payment agreement is possible, a war can be avoided if the total expected utility at the unique Nash
equilibrium is less than V1 + V2.
An Extension: The Dynamic Version
Here, we consider a dynamic contest with two periods. If there is a winner in the first period, then the
contest ends with the winner occupying the loser’s territory. If the first period results in a draw, then
players do not receive any payoff and the contest proceeds to the second period. The subgame in
this period is similar to the static version with two important differences: (i) losses in territory values
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accumulate and (ii) the strategy set of player i in the second period is restricted to [0, Bi − b1i ] where
b1i denotes the destruction power used by player i in the first period.
We aim to analyze the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this model. Assume that (b11, b
1
2) is
played in the first period. Observing this outcome, in the second period, each player i tries tomaximize
the following expected utility function:
b2i
b2i + b2j + d
[Vi(b1j + b2j ) + Vj(b1i + b2i )] +
d
b2i + b2j + d
Vi(b1j + b2j ).
where bti denotes the destruction power used by player i in period t ∈ {1, 2}. Taking the first-order
condition and solving the corresponding system of equations yield the solution (b̄21, b̄
2
2) which is
already given in Equation (2) with an important difference: instead of Vi in Equation (2), we now have
Vi − αib1j since this is the territory’s value at the beginning of period 2. Obviously, if one of the players
does not possess such a destruction power in the second period, i.e. if b̄2i > Bi − b1i for some i = 1, 2,
then the boundary conditions should be utilized as described in the equilibrium analysis of the static




2 ) of this subgame can accordingly be formulated.
This equilibrium yields the following expected utility function for player i:






i + b2∗j + d
[Vi(b1j + b2
∗










Anticipating this outcome, each player imaximizes the following expected utility function in period 1:
b1i
b1i + b1j + d
(Vi(b1j ) + Vj(b1i )) +
d
b1i + b1j + d
EU∗i ( · ).
As it turns out, this dynamic model is too complicated to be solved analytically. Accordingly, we
provide a detailed numerical example through which we can understand how proceeding to the
second period after a draw might affect equilibrium behavior (see Case 3 in Table 1). We further
analyze four variants of this numerical example and summarize all these results in Table 1.
Consider that V1 = 10, V2 = 16, α1 = 2, α2 = 4, and d = 1. First, in the static model, the
unique Nash equilibrium is (1.921, 2.658). The corresponding winning probabilities are 0.344 and
























249 − 60b11 − 34b12 + (2b11 + b12)2
)
.
Anticipating these strategies, in thefirst period, players choose (1.815, 2.668). This reduces the territory
values to 4.664 and 8.74 at the beginning of the second period, respectively. Moreover, it yields the
following equilibrium strategies in the second period: (1.015, 1.322). Note that the corresponding
winning probabilities are 0.331 and 0.487 in the first period, whereas 0.304 and 0.396 in the second
period.
In the following, an underdog/top dog is defined to be the player who uses less/more destruction
power in the interior equilibriumof the static version in comparison to theotherplayer. In thenumerical
example above, we see that the underdog’s destruction power used in the first period might be less
than the destruction power he/she would use in the static version, while the top dog is using a
destruction power which ismore than he/shewould use in the static version. This favors the top dog in
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Case 1 V1 = 10, V2 = 10 2.500 2.500 2.429 2.429 1.285 1.285
α1 = 2, α2 = 2
Case 2 V1 = 10, V2 = 16 3.350 3.150 3.162 3.180 1.839 1.490
α1 = 2, α2 = 2
Case 3 V1 = 10, V2 = 16 1.921 2.658 1.815 2.668 1.015 1.322
α1 = 2, α2 = 4
Case 4 V1 = 16, V2 = 16 2.292 3.416 2.260 3.279 1.117 1.866
α1 = 2, α2 = 4
Case 5 V1 = 16, V2 = 16 2.000 2.000 1.937 1.937 1.031 1.031
α1 = 4, α2 = 4
the first period in terms of the ratio of winning probabilities; however, if the second period is reached,
then the underdog becomes more advantaged.
Interestingly, we see the converse of this situation in Case 2. In comparison to the respective
equilibrium strategies in the static version, the top dog uses less destruction power and the underdog
uses more destruction power in the first period. As a matter of fact, these changes are such that the
top dog starts to use less destruction power than the underdog does. However, if the second period is
reached, then the top dog makes a remarkable return. To put it differently, the top dog saves his/her
power to become very dominant in the second period.
Case 4 is an example in which both players’ equilibrium destruction powers used in the first period
are lower than they would use in the static model. Afterward, having a more vulnerable territory
becomes an important advantage for player 2 in the secondperiod, as the ratio ofwinningprobabilities
significantly changes in favor of player 2.
In the remaining cases, we consider symmetric values of parameters. It seems that, as in Case 4, the
prospect of proceeding to the second period after a draw leads both players to use less destruction
power in the first period. Since the symmetric nature of the game is carried over to the next period,
players equally decrease their destruction powers in the second period. As a consequence, in contrast
to Case 4, no player has an advantage in the secondperiod as the ratio ofwinning probabilities remains
to be 1/2.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have assumed that each player is endowed with a territory and studied a war
scenario in which the winner occupies the loser’s territory. The novel feature of our analysis lies in
the assumptions that (i) the value of the territory player i aims to occupy decreases in player i’s own
effort and (ii) the contest may result in a draw, meaning that each player gets to keep his/her own
territory. We have considered both static and dynamic versions of the model. In the static version, we
have characterized the unique Nash equilibrium. Then assuming that the game reaches the second
period only when the first period results in a draw, we have numerically analyzed several cases in the
dynamic version. Our analysis captures insights regarding strategic behavior in asymmetric contests
with endogenous rewards.
Notes
1. Our model captures the case of no draw as a special case. As it is shown in a remark, the equilibrium strategies are
much simpler if the war cannot result in a draw.
2. In that regard, this paper is also related to the literature on the cost of conflict. Noting that engaging in conflict
often imposes costs (evenwhen thedestruction costs arenot considered), this literature investigates theescalation
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of conflict between the contending parties. The interested reader is referred to Kimbrough and Sheremeta (2013)
for a model without destruction and to Smith et al. (2014) for a model with destruction.
3. For an axiomatization of this contest success function, see Blavatskyy (2010).
4. We choose not to impose any upper bound for d. However, it is worth noting that if d is greater than Bi for every
i = 1, 2, then thewinning probabilities p1 and p2 can never be greater than the probability of a draw. Accordingly,
one can argue that when d is too high, the contest is not so competitive.
5. Under our assumptions, the second derivative of the expected utility function is always negative. Therefore, the
first-order condition is sufficient for the best response analysis.
6. The reader is referred to the Appendix for a detailed analysis.
7. Keeping everything else constant, if Vi increases, the reward of winning would not increase for player i, but losing
the contest would be more costly.
8. Keeping everything else constant, if αi increases, the reward of winningwould not decrease for player i, but losing





i , thenBRi always increases in d. On top of that, if this inequality holds,BRj decreases in d for some
intermediate values of bi .
10. Whenαi increases, knowing that the rival’s equilibriumeffort decreases, player i’s equilibriumeffort alsodecreases.
On the other hand, when V1 or V2 increases, since the reward of winning and/or the cost of losing would increase,
we observe an increase in destruction powers used at the equilibrium.
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Appendix
This appendix explains how to find the best response functions reported above. Recall that if player j uses bj amount of
destruction power, player i maximizes
bi
bi + bj + d (Vi(bj) + Vj(bi)) +
d
bi + bj + d Vi(bj).
Given the value function Vi(bj) = Vi − αibj , the first-order condition with respect to bi is
bj + d
(bi + bj + d)2
(Vi − αibj + Vj − αjbi) −
αjbi
bi + bj + d −
d
(bi + bj + d)2
(Vi − αibj) = 0.
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For player 1, this first-order condition becomes
b2(V1 + V2 − α1b2 − α2b1) − α2b1(b1 + b2 + d) + d(V2 − α2b1) = 0
which can also be written as
α2 · b21 + 2α2(b2 + d) · b1 + α1b22 − (b2 + d)V2 − b2V1 = 0.
Solving for b1 yields the following best response function for player 1:
BR1(b2) = −(b2 + d) +
√
(b2 + d)2 +
(b2 + d)V2 + b2V1 − α1b22
α2
.
Considering the symmetric first-order condition with respect to b2 derived from player 2’s problem, the best response
function for player 2 is:
BR2(b1) = −(b1 + d) +
√
(b1 + d)2 +
(b1 + d)V1 + b1V2 − α2b21
α1
.
